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Applicability of International Law
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Old Problems, Current Endeavors
General Applicability of the Law of War
to International Armed Conflict
Parties to the many'substantial interstate armed conflicts since World War II
have been disinclined for various generally political reasons to characterize
those transactions as "war" I or their respective roles as those of "belligerent." ' 2
Instead, conflicts over time have been euphemized as "police actions" or
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'A leading authority characterizes war as a contention by means of a violent struggle, through the
application between two or more states of armed force for the purpose of one overpowering the other
and imposing a settlement of his will. H. LAtEp.pACHr, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol.
II, Longman's, London (7th ed. 1952) (hereinafter Lauterpacht) 202. A declaration or ultimatum
of war is required though seldom resorted to under the Hague Convention No. III Relative to the
Opening of Hostilities of October 18, 1907, Article 1. Lauterpacht emphasizes that the violation of
this requirement was charged against the major German war criminals in the indictment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Id. at 293.
'The principles governing recognition of belligerency are essentially the same as those relating to
the recognition of States and Governments. Certain conditions of fact, not stigmatised as
unlawful by International Law-the Law of Nations does not treat civil war as illegal-create for
other States the right and for some writers, the duty to grant recognition of belligerency. These
conditions of fact are: the existence of a civil war accompanied by a state of general hostilities;
occupation and a measure of orderly administration of a substantial part of national territory by the
insurgents; observance of the rules of warfare on the part of the insurgent forces acting under a
responsible authority; and the practical necessity for third States to define their attitude to the civil
war. Without the latter requirement recognition of belligerency might open to abuse for the
purpose of a gratuitous manifestation of sympathy with the cause of the insurgents. In the absence
of these conditions, recognition of belligerency constitutes illicit interference in the affairs of the
State affected by civil disorders-an international wrong analogous to the premature recognition of
a State or a Government. Refusal to recognize belligerent status notwithstanding the existence of
these conditions must be deemed contrary to sound principle and precedent. Lauterpacht, supra
note 2 at 249, 250.
The rights and obligations which may arise in the case of recognized belligerency include the
obligation of third parties to observe neutrality toward the belligerents or otherwise clarify their
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"pacification ' 3 or "fraternal assistance"'4 and so forth, despite their bare distin-
guishability from the common understanding of war in terms of parties, methods
and consequences.
One product, whether direct or not, of this aversion to the straightforward
terminology of war and belligerency has been the chronic dispute over the firm
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the very type of international armed
conflict in which they should be operative.' Instead, hostile states either have
ignored the question of the Conventions' applicability6 or by political semantics
have tenuously argued their inapplicability, or, to the same end, have
represented their voluntary application, in whole or in part, leaving the question
of the mandatory applicability of the law of war unsettled. 7
This record of ambiguous state practice is the contextual background against
which the present applicability of the Geneva Conventions to international
relationship. The belligerent parties under law are entitled to blockade, visit, and search and seize
contraband articles on the high seas. The advent of recognized belligerency unquestionably triggers
the application to the conflict of the full Geneva Conventions of 1949. See specifically Common
Article 2, Geneva Conventions I-IV, infra note 5.
'Such themes pervaded the early periods of independent state action in the Suez (1956), Lebanon
(1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965) before collective international sanction could be
obtained. Detailed treatment of these general themes may be found in M. S. McDouGAL AND F. P.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1960)
253.
'Soviet Union action in Hungary (1956) and Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact measures with regard to
Czechoslovakia (1968). This outlook is formulated as Soviet legal doctrine by G. I. TUNKIN,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (W.E. Butler trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974).
'Common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states the conditions under which the
full protections of those conventions are applicable:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutuil relations. They shall furthermore
be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.
Common Article 2, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, specifically: The Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of the Armed Forces in the Field of
August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 (hereinafter, Geneva Convention I); The
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3219, T.I.A.S. No. 3363
(hereinafter, Geneva Convention II); The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (hereinafter, Geneva Convention
Ill); The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August
12, 1949, [19551 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (hereinafter, Geneva Convention IV).
'Pakistan and India in Bangladesh (1971-72); Israel and the Arab States (1966 and 1972).
'As to inapplicability: North Vietnam in the recently ended Indochina conflict. The United States
in 1974 indicated that it had voluntarily observed the Geneva Conventions, presumably to the full
scope; see Note from the Government of the United States to the Federal Political Department of
the Swiss Confederation, at note 10, index to Treaties in Force, January 1, 1975, at 393. The South
Vietnamese government followed this line while the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet
Cong) maintained silence.
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armed conflict must be considered. State practice has proven initially the clear
reading of the jurisdictional extension of Common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions to be unfounded by state practice. Principal Western
commentators on traditional international law do not admit of any form of
formally cognizable international conflict other than declared war or a sub-war
contest between formally recognized belligerents. 8 This gap between traditional
theory and operational conditions has permitted the conduct of substantial
international armed violence free of the regularizing and humanizing influence
of the Geneva Conventions.
Applicability of the Law of War
to Internal Armed Conflict
Over the same span of years the incidence and intensity of noninternational,
or internal, armed conflict has increased, often surpassing interstate clashes in
terms of destruction and suffering." The Geneva draftsmen of 1949 had not
neglected to provide a humanitarian legal regime for such conflicts. Under the
provision which was finally approved, the full protections of the four
Conventions would not apply, but instead a system of minimum protection
according to stipulated standards. °
This minimum approach to the humanitarian standards applicable to
internal armed conflicts, as most analyses make clear, was a compromise
between those on the one hand who advocated the extension of the full
protections of the Geneva Conventions regardless of the characterization of the
conflict and those, on the other, who tended to view noninternational conflict as
strictly within the police jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign.
aHague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of October 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277; T.S. No. 539; paragraph 6, Preamble and the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
Common Article 2, supra note 1. See Lauterpacht, supra note 1 at 248.
9The Algerian war of independence from France of 1954-62; the abortive rebellion of Biafra from
Nigeria of 1967-70, and the Indonesian anti-Communist upheaval of 1965-66. The recent Angolan
struggle may be included in this class.
"'Those standards are set out, in part, as follows:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
a. violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
b. taking of hostages;
c. outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
d. the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
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Despite the built-in deference of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions for the primacy of law during internal uprisings against an
incumbent government, the applicability of the article has been skirted in even
the most massive internal conflicts since 1949. 11 Governments nevertheless have
sought to preserve maximum flexibility, in the national interest, in dealing with
internal armed conflicts by avoiding such formal international legal obligations
as might arise once the conflict was acknowledged as more than purely local.
Such obligations, in addition to those imposed on both sides to an internal
conflict by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, might include others
which attach in favor of the challenging group if its status as "insurgent" is
thought to have been recognized by virtue of their treatment by the incumbent
in any manner as a legal personality.II In this respect, state practice concerning
the application of Common Article 3 to internal conflicts has produced the same
unsettled situation as plagues the general applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to international conflict, described above. The result has been the
failure of Article 3, since 1949, to meet the minimum humanitarian
expectations of its drafters.
Contemporary Efforts to Bring Internal
Conflicts Within the Law of War
Accordingly, since 1968, experts of various international agencies and of the
governments of most states have worked to close the gap between the 1949
Conventions and modern conditions of both international and internal armed
conflict. In addition to extending fuller Convention protection to combatants
and civilians during both types of conflict, these proposed supplemental
Protocols 3 would update and make more explicit the substantive and
procedural protections of all four 1949 Conventions under conditions of both
international and internal conflict.
Two provisions of the proposed protocols which have reached hard bargained
"Note 9, supra.
"Insurgency, so far as foreign states are concerned, results, on the one hand, from the determina-
tion of those states not to recognize the rebellious party as a belligerent on the ground that there are
absent one or more of the requirements of belligerency. On the other hand, recognition of insur-
gency is the outcome both of the unwillingness of foreign states to treat the rebels as mere law-
breakers and of the desire of those states to put their relations with the insurgents on a regular,
although clearly provisional, basis. . . . W. W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS, 3rd ed. (1962), p. 396.
"Protocol I (International Armed Conflicts) hereinafter Protocol I, and Protocol II (Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts), hereinafter Protocol II, adopted by the Main Committees to the Diplo-
matic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of the International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflict, in Report (to the United States Secretary of State) of the United
States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Third Session, Geneva, Switzerland,
April 21-June 11. 1976. dated October 15, 1976, Appendix D.
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final draft greatly affect the current relationship of the law of war to internal
conflict. Article 1 of draft Protocol I literally internationalizes certain formerly
internal frays for purpose of the application of the full Geneva Conventions, as
supplemented by the further protections of Protocol 1.14 In the event this
Protocol is approved and enters into force as presently written, parties thereto
could no longer credibly deny full Convention applicability to facts which
indicate an internal struggle for "self-determination."'"
The second major impact of the draft supplementary protocols may be
occasioned by the approval and entry into force of Article I of draft Protocol II,
which extends Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions to all internal armed
conflicts which are not "internationalized" as a result of Article 1 of Protocol I,
and which at the same time are greater in magnitude than mere riot or
banditry. 16 The previously illusive concept of "insurgency" therefore may come
closer to legal definition in this draft Article,' 7 and both incumbents and
insurgents may find less latitude in the future to parry the application of Article
3 semantically to internal conflicts. In the foreseeable event that incumbent
contestants in self-determination struggles further deny the international
character of a political conflict, and the full application to it of the
supplemented Geneva Conventions, the contest should nevertheless fall into the
residual category of insurgency provided by Article 1 of Protocol II; and the
protections of Common Article 3 of the supplemented Geneva Conventions
should attach.
Ascending from the more clear-cut case of the full applicability of (or of only
Article 3) Geneva Convention safeguards to "internal" conflicts, it may with
'Article I-General Principles, states:
I. The present Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for
the Protection of War Victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in article 2 common to these
Conventions.
2. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes
in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 1,
Protocol I, Ibid., at Appendix D, p. 37.
"
5 lbid.. at 2.
"Article I-Material field of appliction, states:
1. The present Protocol, which develops and supplements article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by article I of Protocol I and which take place
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces
or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement the present Protocol.
2. The present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts. Article 1, Protocol II, supra note 13 at Appendix D, p. 91.
"Ibid.. 1.
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decreasing persuasion be argued that the protection of human rights continues
by the application during hostilities of humanitarian provisions generally
thought to apply only in non-hostility situations. Thus, a signatory incumbent
regime should be bound during any internal conflict by the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,"' and by the United
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Article 4 of which allows slight
derogation in cases of proclaimed public emergency, except such derogations
involving deprivation of life, torture, degradation and loss of recognition as a
person before the law.
The present ambiguities concerning the applicability of the Law of War to
internal conflicts are both inherent and designed that way through compromise.
Similar ambiguity thwarts the clear application of the full Geneva Coiventions
to cases of international hostility. We may be assured that the upcoming "final"
session of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference20 will not dispose of such inherent
or self-imposed contradictions. The presently existing consensus among the
experts who drafted the articles concerning internal conflicts and
self-determination struggles promises, however, to result in an extended
discussion of Convention applicability to insurgency situations during the
plenary session of the Diplomatic Conference, and, perhaps, in considerable
change in this problem area.
'"Approved by Resolution 260A (Ill) of the United Nations General Assembly, 9 December 1948;
entered into force on 12 January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). The United States has not ratified
this Convention.
"United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2220; 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16 at 14; U.N. Doc.
A/6546 (1966). The United States has not ratified this Convention.
"'The final session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict was convened during March and
April. 1977.
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